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Some corvids have demonstrated cognitive abilities that rival or exceed those of the great apes; for
example, tool use in New Caledonian crows, and social cognition, episodic-like memory and future
planning in Western scrub-jays. Rooks appear to be able to solve novel tasks through causal reasoning
rather than simple trial-and-error learning. Animals with certain expectations about how objects interact
would be able to narrow the field of candidate causes substantially, because some causes are simply
‘impossible’. Here we present evidence that rooks hold such expectations and appear to possess
perceptual understanding of support relations similar to that demonstrated by human babies, which is
more comprehensive than that of chimpanzees.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The physical world is governed by unobservable forces such
as gravity. These forces govern how objects interact and
impose causal regularities. There is debate about whether
any non-human animals appreciate unobservable forces
(Povinelli 2000; Emery & Clayton 2009); however, there is
evidence to suggest that some animals, including some
species of corvid such as rooks and New Caledonian crows,
are able to appreciate causal regularities when solving
technical problems (Seed et al. 2006; Taylor et al. 2009).
The causal structure of the world may be represented
by formulating expectations about what is possible and
what is not, and so may be used to build more general
rules about physical concepts, such as support. Certain
conditions are required for support, such as contact
between an object and its supporting platform. Only cer-
tain types of contact are appropriate for support and there
must be a sufficient amount of contact between the sur-
faces. Solving support-related problems may involve an
understanding of means–end relations or may be based
on the specific perceptual features related to the spatial
arrangement of object and support (Povinelli 2000).
The causal structure of the world cannot be perceived
directly (one cannot ‘see’ gravity) and must be inferred
from the spatio-temporal relationships between objects
(Chappell 2006).
The development of support concepts in human
infants has been well studied using the ‘expectancy
violation paradigm’, first introduced by Spelke (1985).
When an unlikely or impossible event occurs, the obser-
ver’s expectations are violated and they are surprised,
looking for longer at the event. The increase in looking
time may represent time taken to search for the cause of
the unexpected event, or the time taken to update old
expectations and incorporate new information. Although
the interpretation of perceptual and cognitive capacities
revealed by the expectancy violation paradigm has been
debated (Thelen & Smith 1994; Bogartz et al. 1997, 2000;
Haith 1998; Rivera et al. 1999; Cashon & Cohen 2000;
Munakata 2000; Schilling 2000), many researchers have
successfully employed the technique to investigate physical
knowledge in humans and non-human primates (e.g.
Hauser & Carey 1998; Munakata et al. 2000; Santos &
Hauser 2002; Wang et al. 2004).
Baillargeon and colleagues found that an understanding
of support relations follows a sequential developmental
progression in humans: infants of just three months of
age realize that objects cannot remain stable without con-
tact; however, not until they are 4.5 months old do they
realize that an appropriate type of contact is required,
and only past the age of 6.5 months are they aware
that the amount of contact must also be considered
(Baillargeon et al. 1992, 1995; Needham & Baillargeon
1993). Infants of these ages showed this reasoning only
with dynamic support violations, with static presentations
failing to induce a response in infants under six months
old (Baillargeon 1994). This dynamic test has also been
used with adult chimpanzees, who understood the need
for contact and the amount of contact, but not that the
type of contact must also be considered (Cacchione &
Krist 2004).
Expectancy violation has not been used as a paradigm
with birds, partly owing to the difficulty in identifying
where a bird is looking (Martin 2007), and their capa-
bility to switch from lateral to frontal vision depending
on their distance from the observed object (Dawkins
2002). We therefore used the natural tendency of rooks
to look through small holes (Bird & Emery 2008) to
record the frequency and duration of their looking
behaviour when viewing static images of possible and
impossible support relations.
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2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
(a) Subjects and housing
Subjects were seven adult rooks (Corvus frugilegus), 4 years of
age at the time of testing (one male and six females). These
were part of a hand-raised group colony of 12 rooks, kept in
large outdoor aviaries (20  8  3 m) at the University of
Cambridge’s Subdepartment of Animal Behaviour at
Madingley, UK. All subjects had previous experience with
image presentation on an LCD screen (Bird & Emery
2008) and all took part in four consecutive experiments.
(b) Experimental set-up
Subjects were tested individually in a naturally lit single
chamber (3  1.6  1.5 m) in which they were visually and
physically isolated from the rest of the group (see the
electronic supplementary material, fig. S1). A box was
mounted on the front wall of the chamber in which a hole
(2 cm diameter) was cut. At the back of the box, at a distance
of 50 cm from the holes, the subjects could see a 24-inch
LCD monitor screen (LCD SM244 T, Samsung Electronics,
South Korea). Birds could access this hole by sitting in the
middle of a perch 1.65 m high, such that the hole was at
their natural eye level.
(c) Stimuli
Each experiment presented four picture stimuli, each consist-
ing of an object and supporting platform in varied spatial
arrangements (figure 1). Two stimuli displayed the object
in a possible support position, while the other two stimuli
displayed the object in an impossible arrangement where
the object was not appropriately supported but remained
suspended in this position. The familiar objects used in
experiments 1–3 were a cylindrical plastic container (from
the centre of a Kinder chocolate egg) and a wooden support-
ing platform. The birds had extensive experience of
manipulating these cylinders on a wooden platform in the
past. In contrast, the objects used in experiment 4 were
entirely novel. These were a bottle cork and a metal platform,
neither of which had previously been seen by these birds.
Stimuli were created from photographs of the objects and
the supporting platforms taken at 6 MP resolution (SLR
EOS 400D, Canon, Inc., Tokyo, Japan). The positional
arrangements of the objects were varied using Adobe PHOTO-
SHOP CS2, and saved as JPG files for presentation. The
stimuli were presented on the monitor using Microsoft
Office POWERPOINT 2007, controlled by a PC laptop (Vaio
VGN-FZ11L, Sony Corp, Tokyo, Japan).
(d) Procedure
Each experiment followed the same procedure but differed in
the stimuli presented. Experiment 1 examined whether rooks
are sensitive to the basic contact relation between an object
and a support platform, namely that contact is required for
adequate support. Experiment 2 examined whether rooks
use the type of contact to distinguish between adequate
and inadequate support relations—that is, the supporting
platform contacts the object either from below (supporting)
or to the side (non-supporting). Experiment 3 examined
whether rooks are sensitive to the amount of contact that is
required for sufficient support—that is, the supporting
platform contacts either more than two-thirds of the object
base (supporting) or less than one-third of the object base
(non-supporting). The fourth experiment was designed
to investigate whether support sensitivity was confined to
familiarity or whether similar results would be found with
novel objects.
During trials, each stimulus was presented consecutively
in a pseudo-randomized order, remaining on-screen for
60 s (following the bird’s first look), separated by 30 s of
black screen. Subjects received four trials per experiment,
such that each stimulus appeared in one of the four positions
only once, so avoiding pseudo-replication and controlling for
any effects of stimulus position.
(e) Recording and coding
All trials were video recorded remotely via a camera (Atom
Dome, Model AHC, CSP Technology Ltd, Scunthorpe,
UK) and later scored frame-by-frame (using OBSERVER soft-
ware v. 5.0, Noldus Information Technology, Wageningen,
The Netherlands) without information on which stimulus
was being viewed by which bird. We recorded how often
the bird looked through the hole at the stimuli, and for
how long. The bird’s first look was noted in real time, but
the duration of this look and all subsequent looks were
coded from video.
(f ) Data analyses
Data were normalized using a log transformation correcting a
positive skew. Data were then analysed in GENSTAT v. 10,
using a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) assessing
the effect of stimulus type (possible/impossible) and trial
number (and the interaction between the two) on looking
behaviour. The experimental design meant that there were
two levels of block structure: subject and sub-bird (a subdivision
of subject indicating trials nested within subject).
3. RESULTS
For each experiment, data were analysed treating the four
stimuli independently. As there were no significant differ-
ences between the looking responses towards the two
possible stimuli nor towards the two impossible stimuli
for any of the measures (see the electronic supplementary
material, table S1), we combined the data and examined
whether there were differences between the possible and
impossible categories. There was an effect of trial
number on the mean look duration in experiment 1
(GLMM: F3,18 ¼ 3.49, p ¼ 0.037) but no effect of trial
stimuli
possible 1
experiment 1
experiment 2
experiment 3
experiment 4
possible 2 impossible 1 impossible 2
Figure 1. Picture stimuli used for experiments 1–4. Exper-
iment 1: contact or no contact. Experiment 2: type of
contact. Experiment 3: amount of contact. Experiment 4:
contact or no contact (novel objects). When presented to
the subjects, stimuli were presented in colour.
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on any of the other measures or any of the other exper-
iments. This reflects a strong initial interest in the
stimuli on the first trial of the first experiment with
some habituation afterwards. There was also an inter-
action between stimulus and trial on the first look
and mean look duration of experiment 1 (GLMM:
F3,80 ¼ 3.21, p ¼ 0.027; F3,80 ¼ 3.58, p ¼ 0.017) and on
the first look of experiment 4 (GLMM: F3,80 ¼ 4.78,
p ¼ 0.004), indicating that habituation depended on the
stimulus type.
All four experiments demonstrated a significant effect
of stimulus category on looking response, with a greater
looking response towards the impossible stimuli over the
possible ones. This was represented in all four exper-
iments by a greater mean look duration towards the
impossible stimuli (GLMM: experiment 1, F1,80 ¼ 8.13,
p ¼ 0.006; experiment 2, F1,80 ¼ 8.08, p ¼ 0.006;
experiment 3, F1,80 ¼ 13.64, p , 0.001; experiment 4,
F1,80 ¼ 13.75, p , 0.001; figure 2a) and by a greater
total looking time towards the impossible stimuli
(GLMM: experiment 1, F1,80 ¼ 4.12, p ¼ 0.046; exper-
iment 2, F1,80 ¼ 5.73, p ¼ 0.019; experiment 3, F1,80 ¼
20.94, p , 0.001; experiment 4, F1,80 ¼ 10.87, p ¼
0.001; figure 2b). All experiments except experiment 3
(amount of contact required) showed this difference
from the very first look (GLMM: experiment 1,
F1,80 ¼ 13.78, p , 0.001; experiment 2, F1,80 ¼ 6.44,
p ¼ 0.013; experiment 3, F1,80 ¼ 2.49, p ¼ 0.118; exper-
iment 4, F1,80 ¼ 7.08, p ¼ 0.009; figure 2d); however,
only in experiment 3 was there a difference
in the frequency of looks, with more looks made towards
the impossible than possible stimuli (GLMM:
experiment 1, F1,80 ¼ 0.00, p ¼ 0.970; experiment 2,
F1,80 ¼ 0.45, p ¼ 0.502; experiment 3, F1,80 ¼ 11.42,
p ¼ 0.001; experiment 4, F1,80 ¼ 2.59, p ¼ 0.111;
figure 2c). This may reflect the subtle differences between
the possible and impossible stimuli in experiment 3.
4. DISCUSSION
The results of experiments 1–3 suggest that rooks not
only appear to understand the basic rule that contact is
required for support, but also that appropriate support
requires the correct type of contact and a sufficient
amount of contact. Comparatively then, rooks appear to
have a more comprehensive understanding of support
than chimpanzees—taking into account the type of
contact required, whereas chimpanzees did not—and to
have an understanding of support equivalent to at least
six-month-old infants. Further experimentation will help
to reveal whether rooks, like infants of 13 months of age
(Baillargeon 1995), are able to take into account the
symmetry of the object when deciding the appropriate
amount of contact for adequate support.
The results of experiment 4, whereby rooks responded
to the impossibility of the no-contact stimuli even when
the supported and supporting objects were entirely
novel, suggest that the preferential looking responses are
not due to a preference for perceptual novelty, but
are rather based upon a set of general rules. Although
the rooks had frequently seen the plastic cylinder sup-
ported on a wooden platform and therefore may have
habituated to the possible picture, this could not explain
the equivalent response to the novel objects. However, it
is possible that the preference may be due to positional
novelty independent of object familiarity. It may also
seem probable that the decision as to whether something
is impossibly supported may depend on additional rules
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Figure 2. Looking responses (mean+ s.e.m.). (a) Mean look duration, (b) total look duration (per stimuli presentation),
(c) number of looks and (d) first look duration. White bars indicate impossible stimuli, hashed bars indicate possible stimuli.
*p , 0.05, **p , 0.01, ***p , 0.001.
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such as whether the object is moving or is inanimate.
Birds, for example may be seen defying gravity without
contact to a supporting surface, yet this is not impossible.
After seeing a novel self-propelled box move back and
forth on an apparatus floor, 6.5-month-old human infants
were found to be unsurprised if the box later remained
stable when released either in mid-air or with an
inadequate amount of contact with a platform (Luo
et al. 2009).
The perceptual understanding of support has often
been found at an earlier age in human infants than the
age at which they can act on this understanding (Spelke
et al. 1992; Hood et al. 2000). This may reflect a differ-
ence in the developmental timing of perceptual and
motor skills. When the tasks are kept very simple, infants
show the same responses in expectancy violation and
action tasks (Hespos & Baillargeon 2008). ‘Perception–
action’ dissociations have been found in non-human
primates, persisting into adulthood (Hauser 2003). For
example, adult rhesus monkeys consistently made
search errors when having to take into account physical
properties such as solidity and support in order to
decide where to look for a food item (above or below a
solid surface) that had been released above the surface
and fallen out of sight (Hauser 2001). When shown the
same event in an expectancy violation paradigm, rhesus
monkeys looked for longer at the event when the food
appeared below the surface than above, suggesting that
when the food had apparently passed through the solid
surface their expectations had been violated (Santos &
Hauser 2002).
Rooks, however, have been found to take into account
causal relations in their actions. Seed et al. (2006) found
that seven out of eight rooks solved the two-trap tube
task, a problem involving support, contact and gravity
relations (see Visalberghi & Limongelli 1994, for original
trap tube design). All seven rooks transferred their sol-
ution across a change in stimuli and one female solved
further transfers of the test that could only be solved
through abstracting a causal rule, as they shared no
visual constant. Likewise, New Caledonian crows were
found to solve the two-trap tube task using causal
reasoning, avoiding the hole of the trap that the food
would otherwise fall through and transferring this under-
standing to a trap-table that was visually different but
was governed by the same underlying causal rules
(Taylor et al. 2009). Rooks, like New Caledonian
crows, are capable of using tools, and spontaneously
solve new problems using tools based on an understand-
ing of the properties of the tools and task affordances
(Hunt 1996; Weir et al. 2002; Bird & Emery 2009a,b).
The evidence of a comprehensive perceptual under-
standing of support in rooks further supports the claim
that rooks are able to solve complex problems using
advanced physical cognition rather than trial-and-error
learning.
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